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Abstract
Modern investment theory takes it for granted that a Security Market Line (SML) is as certain as its
"corresponding" Capital Market Line. (CML). However, it can be easily demonstrated that this is not
the case. Knightian non-probabilistic, information gap uncertainty exists in the security markets, as the
bivariate "Galtons Error" and its concomitant information gap proves (Journal of Banking & Finance,
23, 1999, 1793-1829). In fact, an SML graph needs (at least) two parallel horizontal beta axes, implying
that a particular mean security return corresponds with a limited Knightian uncertainty range of betas,
although it does correspond with only one market portfolio risk volatility. This implies that a security
risk premium is uncertain and that a Knightian uncertainty range of SMLs and of fair pricing exists. This
paper both updates the empirical evidence and graphically traces the nancial market consequences of this
model uncertainty for modern investment theory. First, any investment knowledge about the securities risk
remains uncertain. Investment valuations carry with them epistemological ("modeling") risk in addition to
the Markowitz-Sharpe market risk. Second, since idiosyncratic, or rm-specic, risk is limited-uncertain,
the real option value of a rm is also limited-uncertain This explains the simultaneous coexistence of
di¤erent analyst valuations of investment projects, particular rms or industries, included a category
"undecided." Third, we can now distinguish between "buy", "sell" and "hold" trading orders based on
an empirically determined collection of SMLs, based this Knightian modeling risk. The coexistence of
such simultaneous value signals for the same security is necessary for the existence of a market for that
security! Without epistemological investment uncertainty, no ongoing markets for securities could exist.
In the absence of transaction costs and other ine¢ ciencies, Knightian uncertainty is the necessary energy
for market trading, since it creates potential or perceived arbitrage (= trading) opportunities, but it
is also necessary for investors to hold securities. Knightian uncertainty provides a possible reason why
the SEC cant obtain consensus on what constitutes "fair pricing." The paper also shows that Malkiels
recommended CML-based investments are extremely conservative and non-robust.
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uncertainty, robustness, information-gap, Galtons Error, real option value
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1 Introduction
Almost a decade ago I published an article about the consequences of "Galtons Error" and model
uncertainty for fair pricing (Los, 1999). Recently this topic has so dramatically gained in actuality
that the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP) devoted a whole issue of its agship
publication to "The Uncertainty Dilemma," with an Editorial by its Chief Editor Robert Sales on
"Seeking Answers in Volatile Times: The Burden of Uncertainty" (GARP Risk Review, 2008, p.
1). Sales states that "The ability of models to incorporate uncertainty into the valuation process,
particularly in volatile markets, is one of the challenges addressed in this issues cover story"
(p. 12)." From his Editorial and the following articles it is clear that Sales referred to a broader
concept of uncertainty than "probabilistic risk."
My Galtons Error critique of the conventional bivariate Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
based investment decision-making showed that, when there is serious information gap,1 most
investment decision-makers prefer to ignore this lack of information, providing evidence of their
ambiguity aversion (a term ascribed to Fox and Tversky, 1995). In my subsequent book on nancial
market risk analysis and measurement (Los, 2003, Chapter 1), uncertainty was dened as a much
broader concept than risk: "uncertainty = (measurable, and thus insurable) risk + ignorance (=
lack of information)." Measurable or probabilistic risk is well covered by modern option theory.
But uncertainty due to incomplete, or lack of, information is hardly, if ever, discussed in the
nancial literature. In particular, empirical option pricing is seriously a¤ected by our lack of
information about, for example, the levels of persistence of nancial markets (e.g., about the time
distribution of trading events), a nancial valuation issue that only few have researched in detail
(Cf. Jamdee and Los, 2007, for an overview).
Moreover,we suggest that these issues are related to the Ellsberg Paradox, a paradox in decision
theory and experimental economics which demonstrates that peoples decision-making may violate
1 In my Los (1999) article, I called it the "ignorance gap," but that is, strictly speaking, incorrect since we are
dealing with a gap in our information or knowledge, not a gap in our ignorance. However, the measurement of our
information gap is a, skeptical but plausible, measurement of our ignorance
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the tenets of expected utility theory, thereby providing more evidence for ambiguity aversion, which
cannot be accounted for by utility theory (Los, 2003, pp. 16-17).2 Remarkably, this Paradox
holds true regardless of any utility function or risk aversion. Thus ambiguity aversion is a concept
di¤erent from the more familiar concepts of risk aversion or liquidity preference.
My bivariate Galtons Error critique of 1999 was followed by a similar critique of multivariate
country risk analysis in the context of complex multi-asset-multi-country-multi-currency portfolio
management in reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 (Los, 2006). Only recently I learned
that mathematicians Ben-Haim and Sniedovich are currently probing similar non-probabilistic
decision-making theory issues more generally (Ben-Haim, 2006; Sniedovich, 2007). Ben-Haims
information (info-) gap decision theory is a non-probabilistic decision theory seeking to optimize
robustness to failure, or opportunities for prot, under severe uncertainty. In that sense, this
Knightian (strict or severe) uncertainty theory is very di¤erent from the theories of decision-making
under probabilistic risk, discussed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The modeling of Knightian
uncertainty is done as an information-gap based on incomplete, or lack of, information rather than
as a known or measurable probability distribution (Ben-Haim, 2006, p. xii). An information-gap
model does quantify the possible range of uncertainty, but without any measure function.
Sniedovich (2007) is critical of any information-gap models, which, he asserts, generically
resemble Walds Maximin models (Wald, 1945, 1950) and, therefore, can lead to only locally
optimal and, therefore, rationally limited decisions. However, this paper demonstrates that this
is a very doubtful, if not outrightly wrong, assertion, since information gap decision models do
not use a probabilistic measure function: they focus on the incompleteness or lack of information.
Walds Maximin model underlies, for example, Markowitz portfolio optimization, by maximizing
the average returns and minimizing the risks of portfolio investments. But Walds Maximin model
2 This Paradox was popularized by Daniel Ellsberg (1961), although a version of it was already noted by John
Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1921, pp. 75-76, p. 315, ft. 2). However, Keynes confused the issue by introducing the
concept of "subjective probability." It was actually KeynesChicago School opponent Frank Knight (1964; original
1921) who made the scientically essential distinction between measurable, probabilistic and thus insurable risk,
and non-probabilistic uncertainty due to lack of information, which is non-insurable.
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does not take account of incomplete information about all possible "states of Nature," and of
ambiguity aversion and its consequent thirst for scientic R&D, which can expand the known set
of "states of Nature" and reduce Sniedovichs "region of severe uncertainty," while Ben-Haims
information gap model does. Walds Maximin decision function, and thus also Markowitz portfolio
optimization, relies on an existing known set of states of Nature and does not incorporate possible
knowledge set expansion by R&D.3
Although the rationality of investment decision-making under uncertainty is, indeed, limited,
it is only limited by lack of information. Such a limit can always be rationally pushed further
out into the average return/uncertainty space by seeking more investment information, i.e., by
research and development (R&D). Knightian information-gap models have already been studied or
applied in a wide range of applications, including engineering, biological conservation, theoretical
biology, homeland security, economics, project management, meteorology, earthquake analysis,
and statistics, but only recently in nancial-economics (Ben-Haim, 2004).
Although, in economics, Shackles 1972 "non-distributional uncertainty variable" bears some
similarity to an information-gap variable (Shackle, 1992, p. 23), there had been no follow-up in the
nancial-economic literature until recently. In reaction to the severely uncertain Asian Financial
Crisis, we predicted (Los, 1999; and 2003, pp. xxi-xxxi) that such Knightian uncertainty analysis
would nd a natural home nancial-economics in the context of both the increased occurrence of
irregular nancial "crises" (as Ben-Haim, 2005, and, in particular, Beresford-Smith and Thomp-
son, 2007, demonstrate) and in the context of the recent concerns of the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) about what constitutes "fair pricing" (Cf. Hughes, Guerrera and Chung, 2008,
regarding the SECs concern regarding SFAS 157 on "fair value measurement").
Non-probabilistic Knightian model uncertainty has serious consequences for the fair pricing of
companies and investments in general. But these issues were thought to be indiscussible in the
3 Sniedovich error of assertion is similar to that of the adherents to the Intelligent Design of the Universe, who
presume to know all "states of Nature." Human knowledge is inherently limited, expandable and replaceable, i.e.,
incomplete.
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conventional nancial-economic theoretical context. Ive received many personal, and sometimes
vehemently negative reactions, to my Galtons Error critique. Perhaps, there was a good reason
for such a remarkable silence about a fundamental nancial valuation oversight. Indeed, most of
my academic and professional respondents acknowledged that my critique was correct. However,
they also conded that they could not imagine how to incorporate the consequences of Knightian
uncertainty or lack of information in the standard textbook explanations of capital asset pricing
(CAPM) and arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Corporate Finance, Portfolio Management, and
Investments. Following Keynes (1921) suggestion, they substituted subjective probabilities for
incomplete or lack of information, often in a Bayesian fashion.
This paper attempts to ll all those lacunae by demonstrating algebraically, graphically, and
empirically, both in bivariate Markowitz mean-variance (CML) and Sharpe mean-beta (SML)
contexts, how such Knightian uncertainty or information gap can be represented. It demonstrates
how the value consequences of Galtons Error can be made visible in nance textbook examples
and what impact model uncertainty has on fair pricing. As an unexpected, but felicitous result,
this paper is also able to explain that explains why traders and investors receive not only "buy"
and "sell" signals based on the comparison of market prices and intrinsic values, but also "hold"
signals, and why, therefore, they often remain undecided about investment and trading decisions.
Investors and traders are often ignorant of the extent of the uncertainty of their decision-
making, since the computed risk premia, which are supposed to compensate for risk taken, are
themselves not robust. The consequential behavior of traders (in particular, the decision to "hold"
because of ignorance of the extent of the uncertainty) is directly related to peoples observed
ambiguity aversion: people prefer a sure thing over a gamble. Indeed, another famous nancial-
economic Paradox presaged such inconsistency of actual observed nancial choices with the predic-
tions of expected utility theory. Allais (1953) argues that it is not possible to evaluate portions of
decision choices independent of other choices presented. The Allais paradox is the counterexample
for the presumed independence of the decision alternatives and the existence of complementarity.
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Investment decision-makers prefer a sure thing over a gamble. Only when there is a sure trading
decision, there will be buying or selling action. In the case of Knightian uncertainty (= lack of
knowledge) investors prefer to hold on to their existing investments.
Of course, this paper builds on the venerable CAPM, which is a theory about the ways assets
are priced in relation to their risk. This theory was simultaneously and independently, discovered
by John Lintner (1965), Jan Mossin (1966) and William Sharpe (1964, 1970), and is now part-and-
parcel of any textbook on Investments. We extend Haugens (2001, in particular, Chapters 8-9)
as one of CAPMs mathematically most precise textbook explications, so that it can incorporate
and represent Knightian uncertainty. For the simplicity of textbook-like exposition, this paper
accepts all three conventional Assumptions made in that text (Haugen, 2001, pp. 202-205):
"Assumption I: Investors can choose between portfolios on the basis of expected return and
variance" (p. 201);
"Assumption II: All investors are in agreement regarding the planning horizon and the distri-
bution of security returns" (p. 205); and
"Assumption III: there are no frictions in the capital market" (p. 205).
Of course, these three Assumptions can be relaxed and made more realistic in the real world.
This paper is organized as follows. First, my original 1995 empirical example of Galtons Error
and the investment information gap are updated to 2007 in the context of mutual funds investing.
Next, the concept of idiosyncratic risk is analyzed and in another empirical example industry
sectors are ranked according their recent levels of idiosyncratic risk. Third, adjusting one of
Haugens examples in the context of Markowitzportfolio selection, idiosyncratic risk is measured
relative to the Capital Market Line using Sharpe Ratio analysis, given a simple measurement
of the extent of our information gap. Fourth, Knightian uncertainty is analyzed in the context
of CAPMs Security Market Line analysis. Again the extent of the uncertainty range of the
idiosyncratic risk premium and demonstrate why there must be considerable "hold" signals in
addition of the usual "buy" and "sell" signals. The fth section is taking the consequence of
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Galtons Error and the existence of n information gap still one step further into fundamental
present value analysis of growth opportunities in the context of real options valuation. The
paper concludes with some generalizations and comments on the investment, trading, and policy
consequences of this epistemological - Knightian non-probabilistic uncertainty - extension of Dixit
and Pindycks (1994) "decision-making under (probabilistic) uncertainty."
2 Galtons Error and Our information gap
In this paper the implications of Knightian, epistemological, or model uncertainty for investment
valuations are traced in the contexts of portfolio selection, capital asset pricing and real option
pricing. Since Galtons Error and its consequences for the usual beta-classication (aggressive,
neutral, defensive, and - the new category -undecided) has already been discussed in Los (1999),
Figure 1 (reproduced from Los, 1999, p. 1809) provides a very brief analytic summary.
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
First, the implications of the existence of model uncertainty for the empirical computation of
correlations and beta or relative risk coe¢ cients are traced. The correlation data of two variates,
e.g., the rate of return of a rm, fund, security, or project investment i and the rate of return of
a market index M is summarized in a 2 2 data covariance matrix
 =
2664 ii iM
iM MM
3775 (1)
where iM is the covariance between the two respective rates of return, while ii and MM
(= 2i and 
2
M in the conventional statistics notation) are the respective variances. Using the
correlation information of this matrix, bivariate empirical model certainty and uncertainty, re-
spectively, of the (linear) relationship between the two rates of return can be expressed in ve
equivalent ways:
1. Bivariate model certainty:
(i) jj = iiMM   2iM = iiMM (1   2iM=iiMM ) = iiMM (1   2iM ) = 0, the data
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covariance matrix is singular, i.e., its determinant equals zero. This implies that
(ii) 2iM = 
2
iM=iiMM = (iM=MM )=(ii=iM ) = L=U = 1, the coe¢ cient of (bivariate)
determination is one. Thus
(iii) L = iM=MM = tan(1) = tan(1 + 2) = 1= tan(3) = 1=(iM=ii) = U , the lower
(L) and upper (U) projection slopes L and U , respectively, coincide.
4 This implies that
(iv) 2 = 0, there exists no information gap and
(v) NS =
sin 2
sin 1 sin 3
=
(1 2iM )
2iM
= 0, the noise/signal ratio is zero and, thus, the data imply a
certain model.
2. Bivariate model uncertainty
(i) jj = 0, the determinant of the data covariance  is zero. This implies that
(ii) 0 < 2iM < 1, the coe¢ cient of determination shows inexact determination, i.e., incomplete
explanation; and
(iii) L < U the slope results of the lower and upper projections dont coincide; therefore
(iv) 0 < 2 < 2 , there exists an information gap; and
(v) NS > 0, there is some noise, since the inexact data contain some noise in addition to the
signal and, thus, the data imply an uncertain model.
To amplify this last point: if there is some noise in the empirical data (and there usually is!), i.e.,
the data are not exact and we are confronted with our information gap of Knightian uncertainty,
(1 2iM ), expressed as a percentage of the total data variation iiMM . Thus, (1 2iM ) measures
the extent of our lack of information without the use of a probabilistic measure function. It is
Galtons Error to only accept (and publish!) L as "the (only) estimate" of the slope coe¢ cient
. It should be obvious that with empirical data there is is a (limited) range of possible estimates
[L; U ], which represents the empirical model uncertainty.
4 The L is the "regression" or projection coe¢ cient of the orthogonal projection of rate of return of investment
i on rate of return of the market index M , while U = 1=(iM=ii) is the inverse projection coe¢ cient of the
orthogonal projection of the markets rate of return on the investment is rate of return.
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2.1 Systematic Risk Categorization of Mutual Funds in 1995 and
2007
Los (1999) demonstrates the consequences of Galtons Error and the information gap for the
systematic risk and beta-categorization of 3; 125 (out of an original 7; 051) mutual funds in Morn-
ingstars Principia for Mutual Funds Universe in 1995. This analysis is updated for 2007 in Table
1 for 16; 354 funds (out of an original 20; 340) funds from the equivalent Morningstar Principia
MUTUAL FUNDS ADVANCED data base as of November 30, 2007.
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The number of appropriately selected funds (= those with a computed L and 
2
iM ) was in
2007 ve times larger than in 1995. While the percentages of truly defensive and neutral funds
remained about unchanged (21:4% in 2007 versus 18:4% in 1995, respectively, 1:1% in 2007 versus
0:6% in 1995), the percentage of undecided funds was cut almost in half (from 46:3% in 1995 to
21:7% in 2006) in favor of the category aggressive funds (from 34:2% in 1995 to 55:8% in 2007).
Thus, the percentage of defensive and undecided funds remained almost unchanged in more than
a decade, while the percentage of aggressive funds in 2007 was more than double than either of
them. This signies a shift to the construction of more aggressive and risky funds to satisfy the
growing (global) demand for better average returns, of course, at the expense of more speculative
risk-taking.
Our initial motivation in Los (1999) was to expose the marketing folly of categorizing funds
as defensive (63:7% under the then prevailing AIMR Performance Presentation Standards, while
in e¤ect more than half of them (46:3% of the total in 1995) should be properly classied as
undecided. Under the same misleading, but industry-recommended performance standards, the
current CFA-Institute beta-classication would make us still believe that 43:1% of the funds are
defensive, while in fact only half of that percentage (21:4%) truly is, while the other half (21:7%)
should be categorized as undecided. The category "undecided" does gure neither in the CFAs
beta-categorization nor in the standard nancial textbook beta-categorizations, a clear indication
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of ambiguity aversion by nancial economists. Any ambiguity in such investment decision-making
is e¤ectively averted by ignoring it, of course, at the great peril of actual investors. But it is
not necessary to ignore such ambiguity. In fact, it is easy to account for model uncertainty
and ambiguity, even in the simplest nance textbook examples, as the following examples will
demonstrate.
3 The Certain Capital Market Line (CML) and the Uncer-
tain Security Market Line (SML)
Like nancial textbooks, for the simplicity of explanation, this paper follows Markowitz (1952,
1987, 1991, original 1959) by making two assumptions. First, we assume that the distribution of
portfolio returns can be described by only two relevant parameters, the mean and the variance. In
order to be able to choose portfolios based on expected return and variance only, we also assume
a quadratic relationship between our utility and the value of our portfolio (Tobin, 1958).
We assume that a risk-free rate exists, e.g., a U.S. Treasury bill or zero-coupon bond maturing
at the end of the planning (or investment) horizon and with its payment guaranteed by the
government. In the following numerical examples, that risk-free rate is taken to be 3:5% (as of
January 22, 2008, after the Fed cut the Fed funds rate by 75 basis points). Because of the existence
and general availability of this risk-free rate, it makes sense that all market participants hold the
same portfolio of risky investments, indicated by portfolio M in Figure 2. This portfolio is the
portfolio in the e¢ cient set with the highest Sharpe Ratio:
[E(rM )  rF ]=M (2)
Figure 2 is our extension and Knightian uncertainty adaptation of Figure 8.8 in Haugen (2001,
p. 210) and it is the central theoretical Figure of this paper.
[PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Since in this simple version of CAPM everyone is holding the same portfolio M of risky
investments, the contribution an investment i makes to the market portfolio can be measured by
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the covariance of its returns on the market portfolio, which can be more revealingly expressed by
using the correlation coe¢ cient
iM = [L=U ]
0:5 (3)
, i.e., the ratio between the lower and upper beta, so that the covariance:
iM = iMiM (4)
= iM [L=U ]
0:5 (5)
In other words, three risk factors play an equal role in the contribution of investment i to
the markets valuation: the volatility of investment is returns, i, the volatility of the markets
returns, M , and the Knightian model uncertainty, here expressed by the beta ratio L=U . The
conventional nance textbook presentation mentions only the rst two factors and ignores the
beta information gap.
3.1 Certain Capital Market Line
This Knightian uncertainty will rst be graphically presented in Figure 3, which is our extension
and adaptation of Figure 8.12 in Haugen (2001, p. 216), and then discussed in detail using Sharpes
Ratio analysis. Figure 3 looks in detail at the Markowitz portfolio space in which Sharpe Ratio
analysis takes place. Sharpe Ratio analysis implies the allocation of investment is total risk over
its hedgeable systematic risk and non-hedgeable idiosyncratic risk. It is only idiosyncratic risk
which provides investment i with its comparative advantage in a competitive market analysis,
since only taking idiosyncratic risk generates truly protable investments.
[PLACE FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Sharpe Ratio Analysis
The Sharpe Ratio of rm i or its risk premium per unit of risk, also known as the price of its risk
(measured by the standard deviation of its total rates of return), is a percentage of the price of
the markets risk, and can be measured in various ways: by the lower projection of the rms beta
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or by its upper projection and its coe¢ cient of market determination, as follows:
[E(ri)  rF ]=i = L[E(rM )  rF ]=i (6)
= 2iMU [E(rM )  rF ]=i (7)
= [iM=MM ][E(rM )  rF ]=i (8)
= [iM=iM ][E(rM )  rF ]=M (9)
= iM [E(rM )  rF ]=M (10)
Thus, the Sharpe Ratio of rm i is a correlation coe¢ cient iM   multiple of the Sharpe Ratio
of the market M , which measured the slope of the Capital Market Line in Markowitzmean-risk
fE(r); )g  space.
Box: Market E¢ ciency and the Dispersion of Sharpe Ratios
In the Spring of 2008, immediately after the substantial stock market correction
of January 16, 2008, I did a little experiment with my MGT402 Asset Management
Practicum class of the Peter F. Drucker and Masatoshi Ito School at the Claremont
Graduate University. The class consisted of 44 candidates for the M.Sc. in Financial
Engineering degree, 11 candidates for the MBA Finance degree, one candidate for
the MA degree in Economics, and three Senior Honor students in the 4+1 program.
These 59 students came from the China (34%), India (31%), USA (25%) and other
countries (9%) and had widely di¤erentiated educational backgrounds and professional
experiences. At the beginning of the 2008 spring semester each of these students
received a brokerage account with a ctitious $500; 000 (in Treasury bills) and 200
trades on STOCK-TRAK Global Portfolio Simulations (www.stocktrak.com) and was
encouraged to build a portfolio. Round-the-clock trading started on January 28, 2008
and ended on April 30, 2008. All students started their trading with a Sharp Ratio - the
risk-adjusted measure using standard deviation and excess portfolio return calculated
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to determine reward per unit of risk - equal to zero. The risk-free rate for these Sharpe
Ratio calculations was 3% annual compounded daily. They could trade stocks, bonds,
mutual funds, commodities, options, futures, and future options. They could buy,
sell, buy on margin, and sell short most stocks, options and funds traded in both the
United States and Canada and use limit and stop orders. They could also buy and sell
stocks from the worlds exchanges, including London, Hong Kong, etc. Weekly their
portfolio and Sharpe Ratio rankings were shown to encourage intra-class competition.
After three months of trading, the evenly distributed Sharpe Ratios of the students
individual portfolios ranged from a minimum of  3:51 (negative risk premium) to a
maximum of +3:38 (positive risk premium), with 33 students having positive Sharpe
Ratios and the remaining 26 having negative Sharpe Ratios. The Sharpe Ratio of risk-
free interest investment only was 0:39. One Indian student, Deep Thomas Moolayil,
turned out to be a sensitive expert commodity trader, who took advantage of the strong
markets in wheat, soy beans, oil, gold, platinum and palladium: within three months
he ended up with $4:9 million and would be a real asset to a commodity trading rm
like Cargill, Inc. in Minnetonka, MN. His Sharpe Ratio was 2:21. I placed a few trades
myself and ended up with $686; 121 with a Sharpe Ratio of 1:88. The message of this
exercise was that global portfolio investing is currently a very e¢ cient business with
winners and losers almost equally distributed over time, once all nancial and model
uncertainty are taken into account. This is quickly generated empirical evidence for
the theoretical truth of Figure 3.
4 Idiosyncratic (Firm-Specic) Risk
The total market risk is measured by the variance of the total returns of an accepted benchmark
market index, e.g., the S&P500 Index MM (= 2M in the conventional statistics notation). Fur-
thermore, we maintain that the probabilistic total risk risk of investment (rm, or security) i is
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measured by the variance of its total returns ii (= 2i in the conventional statistics notation).
In the Markowitz space we often portray the standard deviation or volatility i = 0:5ii , i.e. the
square root of this variance. We have already encountered the coe¢ cient of market determina-
tion of investment i, 2iM , so that we can present the allocation of the total investment risk over
systematic (market) risk of rm i, as percentage of its total risk in terms of the information gap
ii
2
iM = ii[L=U ] (11)
Or, we can present, in a completely equivalent way the idiosyncratic (rm-specic) risk of rm
i, as percentage of its total risk
ii[1  2iM ] = 1  ii[L=U ] (12)
OnMay 18, 2008, Professor Robert Merton pointed out in his Honorary Doctorate lecture at the
School of Mathematical Sciences of Claremont Graduate University, that individual investments
(projects, rms, securities, industrial sectors, or, in his example, countries) distinguish themselves
competitively by their idiosyncratic risk. In other words, their idiosyncractic risk, which is inherent
in their technological and marketing innovations, determines their (David) Ricardian comparative
advantage, which ensures that the (Adam) Smithian investment specialization and consequential
trade amongst them, leads to rising living standards and increases in wealth. He also showed that
simple derivative nancial instruments, such as swaps (itself a trade of di¤erent cash ows and
thus of di¤erent risks) can help to swap that idiosyncratic risk for systematic and thus insurable
risk.
In other words, a swap can reduce the information gap [1  2iM ], of course, for a price. Thus
a swap arrangement intermediates the risk level between diversiable, but unique idiosyncratic
risk and non-diversiable, non-unique systematic risk. A swap can therefore reduce or enhance
idiosyncratic risk of a particular rm and make it less competitive (more behaving like the market
portfolio) or more competitive (more behaving idiosyncratically). When a swap reduces idiosyn-
cratic risk, it increases an investments Sharpe Ratio, so that an investment aligns itself more with
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the CML. When a swap increases idiosyncratic risk, it reduces an investments Sharpe Ratio, so
that an investment distinguishes itself and behaves less like a CML investment. Therefore a swap
does not reduce the total risk of a particular investment. It only changes the allocation between
insurable market risk and non-insurable idiosyncratic risk, and in return it transfers some value
from the risk-aversive insurer to the risk-taking speculator. Going a little bit ahead of the story of
this paper, a swap does not alter the total investment risk i, but can enhance the average return
of a particular investment, by reducing the information gap and moving the investor closer to a
higher rate of average return E(ri), by transferring the investor to a higher correlation iM ray
in Fig. 3.
Figure 4 provides our empirical industry sector counterpart of theoretical Figure 3. For exam-
ple, the utilities industry has a total risk of about utilities=21.9%; allocatedover5.5%marketriskand16.5%
idiosyncraticrisk; withamarketcorrelationofonlyM;ut = 0:0039 = 0:39%. In contrast, the -
nancial services industry has a total risk of about fs = 25:9%, allocated over about 10% mar-
ket risk and 15:9% idiosyncratic risk, with an almost ten times higher market correlation of
M;fs = 0:387 = 38:7%. Thus the nancial services industry has a higher total risk than utilities,
it has market risk about twice as high as that of utilities, while its idiosyncratic level of risk is
about the same as that of utilities.
[PLACE FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
4.1 Ranking of Industry Sectors According to Their Idiosyncratic Risk
It is clear from Table 2 that investments, in particular here industry sectors, show very large
percentages of idiosyncratic risk, which determines their specic comparative advantage in their
markets. Any decisions regarding investments into individual rms or into industrial sectors or
countries are subject to severe uncertainty. We will now trace the di¢ culties created by such large
percentages of idiosyncratic risk for valuation modeling and how we can still arrive at some fairly
robust investment decisions, even without the use of derivatives.
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[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In Table 2 we notice that the following four industry sectors experience the highest levels of
idiosyncratic risk, or technological specialization, and thus with the highest level of Ricaridan
comparative advantage: utilities, health care, telecommunications and software. Utilities include
very specialized electricity-generating installations, e.g. coal, gas, geothermic, hydro-, nuclear or
solar electricity generating plants that are stationary and cannot be moved and are therefore au-
tomatically specialized. Health care facilities or emergency rooms, hospitals, retirement homes
have the same comparative handicap. Telecommunications installations are sometimes stationary,
like cell-phone systems or geostationary satellite systems, and need very expensive hardware in-
frastructure. Software appears to be easily transferable, but in reality is very platform-specic or
is protected by a strong patent, requiring high licensing fees, like Windows-based (not hard-wired)
or Mac-based software (hard-wired).
5 Uncertain Security Market Line and Idiosyncratic Risk
The purpose of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is to compute a discount or "hurdle"
rate E(ri), which depends on the level of market determination, or its counterpart, investment
specic idiosyncrasy. It does so by computing an idiosyncratic risk-premium, derived from the
markets risk premium, and then adding that idiosyncratic risk premium to the risk-free rate
rF . The conventionally identied Security Market Line (SML), by which these computations are
accomplished, is described by the following well-known equation, which relates the investment-
specic risk premium to the market risk premium via a particularly measured relative risk ratio
[E(ri)  rF ] = L[E(rM )  rF ] (13)
which we designate by SML(1) in Figure 5.
[PLACE FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
This SML(1) has E(ri) on the vertical axis and L on the horizontal axis. This investment is
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risk premium is a L multiple of the markets risk premium. But this is not the only possible
representation. When we substitute for L = 
2
iMU , we obtain a new Security Market Line, re-
lating the investment-specic risk premium to the market risk premium via a di¤erently measured
relative risk ratio
[E(ri)  rF ] = 2iMU [E(rM )  rF ] (14)
which we designate by SML(2) in Figure 5. This SML(2) has E(ri) on the vertical axis and
U on the horizontal axis. In other words, we need to have now two parallel  axes, one to
measure L and one to measure U . Thus the relative risk  is the parameter whose true value
is subject to severe non-probabilistic uncertainty, which lies in a range of uncertainty [L; U ],
where 2iM =
L
U
measured by two projection estimates L and U , respectively.
5
Interestingly, this CAPM model satises the working assumptions of information-gap theory
of Ben-Haim (2006). The range of uncertainty is potentially unbounded when the coe¢ cient
of determination 2iM approaches zero, since U =
L
2iM
and both estimates are potentially very
poor estimates of the relative risk  and to be substantially wrong (Ben-Haim, 2006, p. 280-
281). In other words, the challenges faced by CAPMs valuation methodology are conceptually,
methodologically and technically more considerable than even originally assessed in Los (1999).
How should we proceed? We decided to proceed by determining the degree of robustness of the
investment decisions that we can base on this valuation methodology, so that we can assess how
could or bad its valuation measurement actually can be.
Both SMLs have [E(rM )  rF ] as a common slope in Sharpes mean-relative risk fE(r); g 
space. This can easily be seen by looking at the market-neutral fE(rM ); 1g point for L designated
5 One of my nancial engineering students asked me how this was possible: do these L and U both measure
the relative risk ? Yes, they do, but their measurements are elastic and the robustness of their measurements
depend on the degree of determination 2iM provided by the original scatter plot of rates of return of the rm
i, ri, and the market rate of return, rM . It is as if you have two elastic measurement tapes and both indicate
the particular measurement to be 1 ("one"), but each measurement tape has a di¤erent actual length, because
they are not rigid like a metal tape, but made of an elastic material. The length of such measurement tapes can
even depend on the local temperature! The higher the temperature - the wider the scatter - the larger the range
di¤erence between the two measurements. Moreover, one cannot assert that one measurement, L, is a "better"
(more "precise") measurement of the relative risk  than the other, U . One can only assert that the di¤erence
between the two measurements (= information gap) is measured by the coe¢ cient of determination 2iM .
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by E(ri) = E(rM ) and L = 1, and the market-neutral fE(rM ); 1g point for U designated by
E(ri) = E(rM ) and U = 1. At both points the slope of each SML(j; j = 1; 2) is [E(rM )   rF ].
However, in the rst case of SML(1) for L = 1, we have
[E(ri)  rF ] = [E(rM )  rF ] (15)
but, in the second case of SML(2), for U = 1, we have
[E(ri)  rF ] = 2iM [E(rM )  rF ] (16)
therefore, the uncertainty of investment is risk premium can be precisely measured by the
di¤erence between the relative positions of both SMLs,as follows
(1  2iM )[E(rM )  rF ] (17)
i.e., by the lack of information percentage of the markets risk premium. This lack of informa-
tion or ignorance percentage of rm is risk premium is the direct counterpart of the information
gap between the respective orthogonal beta projections, since 2iM =
L
U
. The non-probabilistic
severity (or "width") of this information gap is measured by (1  2iM ). This is a measure of the
quality of the investment information and analysis available to investors and traders. By not in-
cluding this information gap in the conventional textbook SML, Sharpe transferred (unwittingly,
Im sure!) Galtons Error of ignoring this information gap into the domains of Corporate Finance,
Portfolio Management, and Investment valuation and decision-making. Galtons Error is likely to
have resulted in countless misallocations of capital, since it leads to a severe underestimation of
the rational (= taking account of all available information) hurdle rates.
Any investment that has an average return E(ri) below the SML(1) for a particular level of
L -risk, has a too low average return for the given level of measured L risk. The investments
market price is too high relative to its rational valuation and it should be sold. On the other hand,
any investment that has an average return E(ri) above
SML(2) = SML(1) + (1  2iM )[E(rM )  rF ] (18)
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for a given level of U risk, has a too high average return for a given level of measured U risk.
Its market price is too low relative to its rational valuation and it should be purchased. Between
the two SMLs there is not enough information to make such clear-cut buy or sell decisions and
the investors are advised to hold the investment if the investment is already purchased, or not to
make the investment when no investment has yet been made.
The maximal uncertainty of that investment decision process occurs when the coe¢ cient of
market determination 2iM = 0, when the Knightian decision uncertainty is 100% and the rational
investment decision uncertainty is maximally equal to the market risk premium [E(rM )   rF ].
That occurs when the investment project exhibits only idiosyncratic risk and no systematic risk.
Since the information gap (1  2iM ) = 100% (L = 0 and U =1),
SML(2) = SML(1) + [E(rM )  rF ] (19)
may be called the ultimate robustness case, since SML(2) provides the highest hurdle rates with
the greatest tolerable uncertainty for making rational investments, to purchase a rm or to start
a project, and SML(1) provides the lowest hurdle rates to abandon investments and to sell a
rm most protably. In this fashion, we have now discovered a simple methodology to identify
investment alternatives that are robust to the greatest information-gap uncertainty, which just
extends the traditional version of the CAPM.
Box: Rule of thumb for investing under extreme uncertainty: we can now
formulate a simple rule of thumb for investing with the greatest shortage of informa-
tion, since most coe¢ cients of market determination for individual investments, rms,
industry sectors, etc. are close to zero (as we noticed in Table 3A: compute the hurdle
rate for your investment opportunity using the conventional Sharpe Security Market
Line SML(1) and add the current market risk premium (e.g., the 220 basis points
market risk premium of our empirical example) to it to nd the hurdle rate with the
greatest tolerable risk premium for making an investment.
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On the other hand, the minimal uncertainty of that decision process occurs when the coe¢ -
cient of determination 2iM = 1 and the Knightian information uncertainty equals zero, since then
SML(2) = SML(1). That zero Knightian uncertainty, or certain SML case may be called the op-
portuneness case since then only sweeping success is possible. But one must remain aware that the
robustness of opportuneness case is nil. Interestingly, in that opportuneness case, investments are
located on the Capital Market Line (CML). Such absolutely certain linear portfolio combinations
have been advocated by Burton Malkiel (1990) in his famous Random Walk Along Wall Street
book since 1974.6 It should be no surprise that Malkiel strongly recommended to be always on
the CML, i.e., to invest along the linear combination of cash and the market index according to
ones risk preferences, because on the CML the information gap equals zero: (1   2iM ) = 0 and
investment decisions are no longer ambiguous.
Thus, Malkiels investment recommendations appeal to investors who are ambiguity-averse.
Malkiels ambiguity-aversion di¤ers from Tobins liquidity-preference, although they are related
as follows. Tobins liquidity-preference explains the existence of the CML (Tobin, 1958). But
Malkiels ambiguity-aversion recommends to move out of Markowitzportfolio, encompassed by
the parabolic opportunity frontier in Fig. 2, towards the CML. This can be done, as Merton
suggested by swapping risks.
Since the robustness of that Malkiels recommended CML-based investments is nil, even the
smallest changes in investment information and thus of nancial market circumstances must lead
to instantaneous changes in such CML-based investments. The consequential rebalancing of the in-
vestment portfolios may cause an unforeseen accumulation of transaction costs (which are assumed
to be zero in this paper for the sake of explication!). Thus Malkiels extremely conservative, oppor-
tune, but non-robust recommendation to always position ones portfolio on the CML is expensive
for actual investors, when transaction costs are taken into account. New investment information,
e.g., publicly available technological innovations obtained by R&D, may shift the CML in either
6 His book is still widely read, and correctly so, and is currently in its 8th edition.
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the propitious or the pernicious direction. The propitious direction of CML would be the upward
rotation in Fig. 3 and the pernicious direction would be the downward rotation. Thus, technolog-
ical innovations can be a double-edged sword for the nancial market. The rotational direction of
the CML is determined by the dynamic movement of the location of the overall nancial market
index in the mean-risk space, E(rM ; M ) . The overall level of the CML is determined by the
cash return rF , indirectly controlled in the USA by the Federal Reserve, and thus by the level of
the Treasury term structure available to the investment market.
One must realize that, on an individual investment project, sector, or rm i basis, the relevant
Sharpe Ratio line of such a project, industry sector or rm i can also be rotated in the propitious
(upward) or pernicious (downward) direction by more investigative research by nancial analysts.
The dissemination of the results of their nancial research may increase or decrease the market
determination of a such a investment project, sector or rm i and increase or decrease its correlation
iM with the overall market. In this fashion an investments own Sharpe Ratio will become more
or less aligned with the Sharpe Ratio of the CML.
Therefore, the dynamic CML-based investment decision model of Fig. 3 does not rely on a
point estimate and, therefore, provides an information-gap model that is not generically equivalent
to Walds Maximin investment decision model. This implies that it escapes the harsh critique of
Sniedovich (2007, p. 125) that "the aw in the Info-Gap uncertainty model"...."lies in the use of a
single point estimate and its neighborhood as an approximation of an entire region of uncertainty."
This expanded CML-based information-gap investment decision model allows for the exploration
of thousands of investment opportunities, which dynamically "bubble up" in the average-return-
uncertainty space of Markowitz.
5.1 Comparative Value Analysis to Buy, Hold, or Sell
We can now execute an information gap, (1   2iM ), or robustness analysis by asking how much
variation in the coe¢ cient of determination 2iM can occur and still produce an unambiguous
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investment or asset trading decision. What are the critical values for investment decision-making
in the CAPM model? It is sometimes di¢ cult to judge how much robustness is needed or su¢ cient,
However, according to information gap theory (Ben-Haim, 2006), the ranking of feasible decisions
in terms of their robustness is independent of such robustness judgments.
To provide a rst indication, lets look at our empirical sector analysis in Figure 6. From
our empirical sector analysis we know that, empirically, the information gap (1  2iM ) in CAPM
analysis is a substantial 85%   94%. Since in our empirical example the market premium is
[E(rM )   rF ] = 5:7%   3:5% = 2:2%. This implies that for investment decisions, the CAPM-
determined investment hurdle rates can be between 85%   94% of the market risk premium of
2:2%, or between 187   207 basis points higher, i.e. considerably higher than conventionally
computed!
[PLACE FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
It can now also be explained why so many investors and stock traders "hold" stock, instead of
buying or selling it. In the conventional biased textbook analysis, the "hold" decision does not
exist, since the SML(1) is a razor-thin line. When an investor found an investment project or rm
with an empirical average return E(ri) below it for a particular L, it was automatically deemed
to have a too low average rate of return, i.e., it was too highly priced and therefore should be sold.
The selling by investors or traders would drive the price down and its average return up, until it
reached the SML(1). But market trading usually overshoots and we would nd ourselves above
SML(1), where investment i would be deemed to have a too high average return, i.e., with a too
low price. Ergo, it would be time to sell the stock. Thus, in the conventional textbook model at
almost no time would any investor sit back and stop trading stock and just hold an investment.
There would be only trading of investment assets or securities.
But that is not what we actually observe in the markets. Most investors buy and then hold
stock for quite a while. Traders on both the buy-side and the sell-side face always two choices:
to buy or to hold, respectively to sell or to hold. The information gap about an investments risk
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premium earnings due to the Knightian uncertainty about what its actual relative risk or  is,
cautions most investors and traders to make no rash decisions and to hold the stock for a while
after buying or not to immediately buy it back after selling. As earlier noted, current empirical
market risk premium uncertainty is between 187   207 basis points wide or 85%   94% of the
neutral market risk premium.
This more realistic market situation can be illustrated in Figure 4 by looking at the three
possible buy, hold and sell situations for aggressive, neutral defensive and undecided stocks. In
other words, there are now 3 3 = 9 possible decision situations, instead of the four conventional
SML(1) trading situations. The four conventional trading situations were the buying or selling of
aggressive or defensive stocks.
Now, strictly speaking market-neutral stocks can only exist when 2iM =
L
U
= 1. That situ-
ation occurs only on the CML and those Malkiel-recommended investments are strictly speaking
not traded, but synthesized out of a linear combination of risk-free cash and an appropriate bench-
marking market index, such as the S&P500. Moreover, the dynamic portfolio replication theory
of Black, Scholes and Merton is also based on such market-neutral, arbitrage free, linear combi-
nations (using the call-put parity equation) and forms the basis of modern nancial engineering
of synthetic nancial instruments of any kind. But as we have seen, such Knightian certainty
situations are only reached post-arbitrage, but do not necessarily exist pre-arbitrage, thanks to
Knightian uncertainty.
Any investment that has a market correlation di¤erent from unity, 2iM =
L
U
6= 1, and thus
experiences an uncertainty of risk premium, allows for arbitrage, i.e., trading, and, therefore,
provides for "buy," "hold" and "sell" decisions. Thus model uncertainty is the "energy" for
investment trading, since continuing regular arbitrage or trading cannot occur without some un-
certainty about fair prices of existing stock or rm values. Without such uncertainty, one would
engineer, manufacture or construct a desired investment portfolio with a particular average return
and risk or fE(ri); ig characteristic by a linear combination of cash and a market index and
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hold it forever. This would lead to a static and very stratied market society, since only inherited
wealth would determine what investments would be constructed and they would all be engineered
in exactly the same way for all times. That situation would also be extremely dangerous for any
society, since it would be unable to adapt to a drastically changed environment.
But modern societies are dynamic merchant societies, i.e., arbitraging or regular trading so-
cieties, which face uncertainties and use such uncertainties in a speculative or insurance fashion
to become wealthy by protable adaptation. The most fundamental societal uncertainty is cre-
ated by innovations, i.e., new, marketable technological ideas that can be implemented, marketed
and sold, because their value is initially very uncertain. Only by regular arbitrage of uncertain
valuations, i.e., of trading their valuation uncertainty is eliminated and our information gap for
valuation, (1  2iM )[E(rM )  rF ] can be reduced.
6 Valuation Uncertainty
6.1 Present Value Analysis of Growth Opportunities
Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) show that long term strategic investment situations or real assets
(factories, mines, o¢ ce buildings, R&D and other non-nancial assets) may be valued as real
options. Real options are situations where option theory is applied to value those very uncertain
investment situations, which are common, for example, to biotech, pharmaceuticals, information
technology, airline manufacturers, oil drilling, etc. One creatively develops Decision Tree Analysis
(DTA) of such uncertain investments and then tries to asses the risks involved. Once such crude
assessments are made to grow or to abandon or to operationally switch, existing neutral probability
based option theory is used to value these complex strategic investments. Such corporate strategic
planning and real option valuations can have substantial impacts on the market value of investment
projects, rms and whole industrial sectors.
Real options analysis (often using binomial decision trees) is considered a big step beyond
static valuation measures, such as price-earnings and price-to-book ratio analysis, although it is
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clear that it does not only involve subjective probabilistic risk assessments, but also Knightian
uncertainty, which leads to incomparability of such idiosyncratic investment projects to traded
assets.7 In this section, we would like to focus on the impact of Knightian uncertainty in real
options analysis, an impact that thus far has not been studied su¢ ciently in the nancial literature.
Growth stocks typically yield high price-earnings and market-to-book ratios. "In fact, it is
precisely the intangible and strategic value of growth opportunities that determines most of the
market value of high-tech rms in a continuously changing environment;" and "There is indeed
a clear appreciation in the market for a rms bundle of corporate real options (present value or
growth opportunities, or PV GO (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004, p. 5; cf. their Figure 1.1 on p. 4).
We updated and expanded the exceedingly simple example of Table 1.1 of Smit and Trigeorgis
(2004, p. 6), using our new understanding of the impact Knightian uncertainty has on investment
valuation. We use this simplest possible corporate nance valuation model of a perpetuity as
representative for a "long term" investment project. The Present Value of Growth Opportunities
or PV GOi of rm i is the di¤erence between its market price per share Pi and the intrinsic value of
its rst quarter economic earnings expectations E1i , or the intrinsic value of its static Net Present
Value (NPV), appropriately discounted at the "hurdle" rate derived from the SML:
PV GOi = Pi   E1i =E(ri) (20)
The expected rst quarter economic earnings consist of cash payments and capital gains and
may include growth expectations. When we express the PV GOi as a percentage of the rms
market price, we have
PV GOi=Pi = [Pi   E1i =E(ri)]=Pi (21)
= 1  (E1i =Pi)=E(ri) (22)
7 Indeed, the very assumption of comparability of investment projects is implied in the conventional assumption
"that the returns of the project are spanned by existing traded assets; in other words, the addition of such a
project to the universe of assets does not materially change the opportunities available to investors." (McDonald,
2006, p. 552, footnote 4). As McDonald (2006, p. 554) states: "....risk-neutral pricing and discounted cash ow
are alternative means of valuing a future cash ow." But the essence of strategic investments is their idiosyncratic
nature of adding a new and protable comparative advantage to the existing investment universe. The idiosyncratic
nature of strategic investments makes comparability non-existing, per denition.
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Thus PV GOi=Pi is the remaining value in percentage of the share price, after comparison of
rst quarter earnings per share with the required "hurdle" rate of return. This explains why the
of high hurdle rates in capital budgeting could be an approximate way to account for the present
value of real options.
Our preceding CAPM based SML - hurdle rate analysis, which takes account of Knightian
uncertainty, leads to an uncertainty range of "hurdle" ratesbecause of the information gap:
E(ri)SML(1)  E(ri)  E(ri)SML(2) (23)
We saw that, based on our empirical sector analysis, that the information gap of hurdle rates
[E(ri)SML(2)   E(ri)SML(1)] is between 187   206 basis points wide. Consequently, there must
exist considerable valuation uncertainty about the present value of growth opportunities in rms
and industries:
(PV GOi=Pi)SML(1)  PV GO=P  (PV GOi=Pi)SML(2) (24)
Indeed, when we applied this investment decision-making technology to 1; 050 rms of Morn-
ingstars Principia STOCKS ADVANCED data base as of December 2007, which could be matched
with one-quarter ahead IBES-projected earnings per share from the COMPUSTAT data base as
of December 2007, we found considerable PV GO=P valuation uncertainty. As an illustration,
we summarize in the following Table 3 average industry sector results corresponding with Table
1.1 in Smit and Trigeorgis (2004, p. 6). According to Table 3, the uncertainty gap of PV GO
percentages, [PV GOi=Pi)SML(2)   PV GOi=Pi)SML(1)], varies between 25 and 481 basis points
depending on the industry sector.
[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Because of this valuation uncertainty due to the Knightian uncertainty gap, the average
PV GO=P is not as certain as real option theorists may want us believe (See, for example, Mc-
Donald, 2006, Chapter 17 "Real Options." See also Trigeorgis, 1998, and Amran and Kulatilaka,
1999), because real option theory is based on the existential comparability of traded assets. But
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strategic long term investment projects have a very high idiosyncratic component. This paper
emphasizes that even when risk is somehow measured, our Knightian uncertainty gap often pre-
vents risk from being well-measured, because of a low degree of information determination, i.e. a
low quality of the available information.
Comparing the empirical sector results of Table 2 and Table 4 it is rather striking that the
industry sectors with the highest levels of idiosyncratic risk appear to correspond with the in-
dustrial sectors with the widest range of valuation uncertainty regarding the percentage of the
market price representing the present value of future growth opportunities, in particular utilities,
telecommunications and software. This appears to be in line with the general observation of Figure
3A, which informs us, rst, that, indeed, the sectors with the highest average returns are the ones
with the highest levels of measurable risk, but, second, that the ones that have more idiosyncratic
risk (lying on a lower market correlation "beam" in Fig. 3) have a relatively lower average rate of
return for the same level of risk.
Again, is no surprise that advanced multivariate options, like quantos (for example, equity-
linked currency options, or currency linked equity options), crucially depend on their so-called
correlation risk ij , which expresses Knightian uncertainty, and that occurs already for compa-
rable,traded assets, for which we have existing pricing processes. The tailing dividend yield of
the underlying, being it of another equity (j) or another currency (rj), must be reduced by the
covariance risk ijij to e¤ectuate an appropriate change in numéraire for the standard Black-
Scholes call formula. Of course, for strategic, highly idiosyncratic, investment projects we lack
even that comparability information.
A note of caution is in order, since this paper assumed wide-sense stationarity of the returns
on investments, so that their relative investment position can be measured by their position in
Markowtz two-parameter average return-risk space . Option theory may be able to fairly (if not
necessarily arbitrage-freely) value investment assets using risk-neutral probabilities derived from
replicating portfolios, even when literal replication of the option is not possible, because the twin
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security does not exist. But this is true only when the return volatility or risk is well-dened and
well-measured by the standard deviation of returns i of a possible underlying asset. The usual
presumption of log-normally distributed asset prices presumes the existence of constant limited
and not of an innite volatility. The presumption of ergodicity in general, in particular, of wide-
sense stationarity of the rate of return distributions, is essential to modern option pricing. But
that presumption maybe based on an illusion, and heavily tinted by our ignorance of the true
workings of the nancial markets, i.e., by our lack of fundamental empirical information about
the markets. To view a rm as a perpetual call option to be valued by using perpetual call option
formulas may the the biggest investment valuation illusion of them all.
Indeed, both the economist and "fractal" mathematician Mandelbrot (1966) and, more re-
cently, the famous option-trader Taleb (2007) have already warned us about nancial market
hubris and the possibility of innite variance, which may result in many previously unrecognized
and undetected "black swans." The possible existence of innite variance implies the possible
existence of innite Knightian uncertainty. It is, again, not surprising that the study of market
"crashes" has recently taken extra quantied ight (Cf. , for example, Sornette 2003). This "il-
lusion of empirical market knowledge," based on the assumed geometric Brownian motion price
di¤usion processes, is now a topic of considerable concern to nancial economists and nancial
risk managers. Weve already urged investors to empirically measure uncertainty in a di¤erent,
non-probabilistic, fashion and to adjust option valuation theory accordingly (Los, 2003; Elliott
and Van Der Hoek, 2001; Jamdee and Los, 2007).
7 Conclusions
In his 1921 book on Risk, Uncertainty and Prot the Chicago economist Frank H. Knight gave
special consideration to dynamic and risk theories. Knight stated that
"The former confuses the e¤ects of change with those of the uncertainty connected
with change - The latter falls into confusion failing to distinguish between risk in the
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sense of a measurable probability and an uncertainty which cannot be measured -
Change according to a known law does not give rise to prot, nor does risk if measur-
able, since it can be eliminated by insurance or some equivalent device." (= Knights
summary of Chapter II, Theories of Prot: Change and Risk in Relation to Prot,
Knight, 2006, pp. 22 -48)
His statement still rings true: known dynamics and measurable probability can be arbitraged
away and hedged (insured), respectively, as applications of modern option theory clearly prove.
But it is also important to recognize that only unmeasurable and thus uninsurable Knightian
uncertainty gives rise to prot. Options price and help, therefore, to insure probability-measurable
risk. Knightian uncertainty can only be reduced by advancements in knowledge. Such possible
advancements in knowledge are driven by R&D nanced out of the prots generated by protable
idiosyncratic investment projects. That is called "venture capitalism." It is the only way to raise
humankinds living standards in a sustainable fashion. All other societal system proposals have
historically failed.
In this paper the most important notion is that of Knightian epistemological uncertainty
or "model uncertainty." The paper demonstrates that the allocation of total investment risk over
measurable, and thus insurable, market risk and idiosyncratic (rm-specic) risk crucially depends
on this model uncertainty. Model uncertainty does not distort the conventional Capital Market
Line based and concomitant Sharpe Ratio analysis, since all investment choices in Markowitzmean
return - risk space can be immediately a¢ liated with their appropriate investment Sharpe Ratios,
which are multiples of the markets Sharpe Ratio, or slope of the Capital Market Line (CML). Their
respective multipliers are uniquely measured by the corresponding market correlation coe¢ cients
ij .
But model uncertainty causes problems within Sharpes mean return - beta space in which the
Security Market Lines (SML) reside, since the beta  is no longer uniquely measured. Galtons
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Error clearly shows that there is a  range. The relative size of that range of  measurability
is determined by the information gap (= 1  2ij = percentage of non-determination). This same
information gap measures the uncertainty range of the risk premium of an investment, which
makes the usual SML analysis and accompanying arbitrage pricing arguments less simple and
much more complex. In a more advanced option analysis context, Knightian uncertainty also
reduces the certainty of the usual Present Value of Growth Opportunity analysis used in Real
Options analysis.
However, the expansion of the conventional investment analysis in this paper helps to ex-
plain not only why, in addition to the usual analytical categories of "aggressive," "neutral" and
"defensive" investments and rms, we have a category "undecided" and why nancial analysts
often remain undecided regarding their recommendations. More importantly, perhaps, it nally
explains, in a textbook fashion, why investors and traders receive "hold" signals in addition to
binomial "buy" and "sell" signals and why investments are "held" and not immediately and con-
tinuously traded (arbitraged) by investors.
Moreover, the existence of model uncertainty also explains why it is di¢ cult for the SEC to
obtain a market consensus regarding what constitutes rm risk and what constitutes fair pric-
ing,let alone arbitrage-free pricing. For arbitrage-free pricing to be complete, model uncertainty
should not exist. But it does empirically exist, because investment analysts do not possess in-
nite knowledge. Empirically well-founded scientic knowledge is more limited and scarce than
generally assumed and therefore very valuable. Asset markets are incomplete because of lack
of such scarce knowledge. Not every new investment opportunity is spanned by existing invest-
ment opportunities. If it were, it could be completely analyzed by Walds Maximin models,
like Markowitz portfolio selection by maximin optimization. The fundamental incompleteness
of investment knowledge - information gaps - prevents that. True innovations cause unique, or
idiosyncratic, investment valuation "noise" that is unexplainable, and is not spanned by existing
investment alternatives. It is this investment model uncertainty that attracts true speculators and
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that ultimately generates true the "prot" that helps to raise living standards in the world.
The most fundamental investment uncertainty is created by those idiosyncratic innovations,
i.e. new, potentially marketable, technological ideas that may be implemented, marketed and sold.
Only "maybe," because their investment value is initially very uncertain, as our example of various
industry sectors clearly shows. Only by regular analysis and trading of their uncertain valuations,
i.e., by increasing investment knowledge, their valuation uncertainty, may be, gradually eliminated
and their information gap of valuation (1  2iM )[E(rM )  rF ] reduced. But this is not necessarily
so, since new knowledge also increases our awareness of new risks and uncertainties, e.g., pollution
and other expensive environmental risks. New knowledge broadens our perspective, but it also
simultaneously replaces old knowledge. Alternative investment opportunities replace older ones
and the investment "scatter" in Markowitz average return-risk space is not necessarily reduced.
New investments continue to "bubble up" and "bubble down" in that investment opportunity
space.
As Frank Knight already presaged, it is for this reason - the continued generation of new
knowledge and of changes in model uncertainty - that this technological noise and its accompanying
model uncertainty pervades the real world of Corporate Finance, Portfolio Management and Real
Option valuations and cannot be completely eliminated. In fact, it is the fundamental energy that
drives the creation and continuation of markets. But nancial economists have been reluctant
to acknowledge the existence of Knightian model uncertainty in their textbook examples, due
to their ambiguity aversion.8 Now that global investment managers are facing many globally
interdependent multi-variate investments, it is urgent to incorporate this model uncertainty into
investment decision-making and to acknowledge its pervasive existence and potential protability.
8 With the exception of great economists, like Joseph Schumpeter (McGraw, 2007) and management thinkers
like Peter Drucker (Drucker and Maciariello, 2008).
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Figure 1:
1995* 2007
    #            %  #  %
1. Morningstar’s Principia for Mutual Funds universe, 11/30/2007    7051 20340
2. Together with the condition  0 < ?iM2 ? 1       3227 16550
3. And with three-year (Sharpe’s) beta 0 < ?L       3215 16354
4. According to AIMR (CFA) Performance Presentation Standards, 1993, 1996:
(i) Defensive funds:   0 < ?L < 1       2047   63.7 7053  43.1
(ii) Neutral, market index funds:  ?L = 1           67 2.1 517 3.2
(iii) Aggressive funds:  1 < ?L       1101 34.2         8784 53.7
Total funds with measurable market risk       3215 100.0 16354 100.0
5. According to Kalman/Los Complete Least Squares (CLS) analysis
(i) Defensive funds:   0 < ?L ???U< 1       608 18.9 3496  21.4
(ii) Neutral, market index funds:  ?L = ?U= 1                      18 0.6 174    1.1
(iii) Aggressive funds:  1 < ?L ???U      1101        34.2 9127  55.8
(iv) Undecided: 0 < ?L < 1 < ?U       1488       46.3 3557  21.7
Total funds with measurable market risk       3215     100.0        16354 100.0
· Source: Los, Cornelis A., Galton’s Error and the under-representation of systematic risk, Journal
of Banking and Finance, 23, 1999, 1793-1829: Table 2 on page 1815
Figure 2:
Risk % Risk % Ratios
Total Risk Firm Risk Market Risk Firm/Total Market/Total
Sector (1)=(2)+(3) (2) (3) (4)=(2)/(1) (5)=(3)/(1)
Utilities 4.8 4.5 0.3 0.938 0.063
Healthcare 21.1 19.4 1.7 0.919 0.081
Telecommunications 22.9 20.7 2.2 0.904 0.096
Software 16.3 14.6 1.6 0.896 0.098
Energy 12.3 11.0 1.3 0.894 0.106
Business Services 14.3 12.8 1.5 0.894 0.106
Hardware 27.6 24.5 3.1 0.888 0.112
Consumer Services 13.1 11.5 1.7 0.878 0.130
Industrial Materials 14.4 12.6 1.8 0.875 0.125
Consumer Goods 11.0 9.6 1.3 0.873 0.118
Media 10.4 8.9 1.4 0.856 0.135
Financial Services 6.7 5.7 1.0 0.851 0.149
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Figure 3:
Average PVGO/P (IBES-based)Using ?
L
Using ?
U Value Uncertainty
Sector (1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1)
Telecommuncations -3.93 0.88 4.81
Software -3.41 0.89 4.30
Media -1.74 0.87 2.61
Utilities -0.89 0.90 1.79
Business Services 0.23 0.95 0.72
Consumer Goods 0.35 0.94 0.59
Financial Services 0.38 0.92 0.54
Consumer Services 0.42 0.88 0.46
Healthcare 0.63 0.95 0.32
Energy 0.68 0.97 0.29
Hardware 0.69 0.95 0.26
Industrial Materials 0.71 0.96 0.25
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